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Résumé / Abstract
Ce texte étudie la différence entre l'aversion relative au risque et la
résistance à la substitution intertemporelle dans la modélisation du risque
climatique. Les préférences récursives stochastiques sont utilisées dans un modèle
numérique stylisé utilisant les scénarios préliminaires GIEC 1998 sur l'économie
et le climat. On montre qu'une aversion au risque plus forte conduit à augmenter
le niveau optimal de taxation de l'énergie. Augmenter la résistance à la
substitution intertemporelle a le même effet qu'augmenter le taux d'actualisation,
tant que le risque n'est pas trop grand. Nous discutons les implications de ces
résultats pour le débat sur l'actualisation et la durabilité sous incertitude.
This paper distinguishes relative risk aversion and resistance to
intertemporal substitution in climate risk modeling. Stochastic recursive
preferences are introduced in a stylized numeric climate-economy model using
preliminary IPCC 1998 scenarios. It shows that higher risk aversion increases the
optimal carbon tax. Higher resistance to intertemporal substitution alone has the
same effect as increasing the discount rate, provided that the risk is not too large.
We discuss implications of these findings for the debate upon discounting and
sustainability under uncertainty.
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Non-technical abstract
In this paper, we propose a modeling framework to analyse risky and intergen-
erational issues. We then apply it to the issue of climate change. This framework
is stochastic recursive utility. It allows to represent a broader range of preferences
than what is usually found in the litterature.
The structure of the paper is the following. The one-page introduction frame
the issue. It requires a graduate level in economic theory to be read. Section
two presents an ultra-long period model of the climate risk named ULTRAL.
Section three presents the calibration of the model, where we discuss numeric
values. Section four presents and discuss the results. Section five concludes.
The appendix defines the model and data used. Lastly, there is the list of the 35
references.
The tool used in this paper, stochastic recursive utility, appeared in economic
theory about twenty years ago. To our knowledge, it has not been previously
used in integrated assessment modeling. On the theoretical side, it allow to put in
perspective the debate on discounting under uncertainty.
Policy interpretations of the results should be conducted with extreme care since
this more a methodological paper. The simplest insight is that the assumption of
a positive expected climate damage is not needed to induce some action now. In
this model, climate change is beneficial nine times out of ten, nevertheless there
is some precautionary abatement.
In a sequential decision making process, the initial level of abatement was found
to be sensitive the date of policy revision. The earlier is policy revision scheduled,
the lower is initial carbon tax level.
The model also show that larger risk aversion strengthens optimal pollution
control and that previous works possibly underestimated the sensitivity of their
results to the shape of the utility function.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper is motivated by two important economic aspects of climate change
economics: intergenerational equity and risk. A classic way to introduce risk is to
consider an utility function with constant relative risk aversion  , such as:
	


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
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A classic way to introduce the issue of intergenerational equity is to consider an
intertemporal objective function such as:
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where ﬃ represents population and  consumption levels, see [2, 19, 30].
This paper focuses on  and on the two parameters of the intertemporal objective
function function: $ , the discount rate for the second time period, and - , the
resistance to intertemporal substitution.
The simplest possible model known to integrate these three parameters may
be stochastic recursive utility, initially introduced by Kreps and Porteus [18]. To
our knowledge, all previously published models of the climate risk literature use
simpler utility functions restricted to - 
. [24, 20, 16]. This situation has left
open a set of question we propose to examine.
From a theoretical point of view, let us first remind that resistance to substitution
- controls the attitude toward variations in consumption across time, under cer-
tainty. On the other hand, risk aversion  controls the attitude toward variations in
consumption across states of the world, at a given date. So the restriction - 
/ is
suspicious since it links two conceptually different aspects of preferences. We will
examine whether there is empirical evidence and economic rationale to support
this constraint, or whether it is an unfortunate sequel of expected utility models.
From a technical point of view, this restriction is particularly inadequate when
analyzing the question of equity under uncertainty. It prevents from considering
plausible situations where society has high risk aversion together with low resis-
tance to substitution, or vice versa. Another direct consequence is that the effect
of resistance to substitution and risk aversion cannot be conveniently investigated:
A change in the curvature in the utility function does not permit an unambiguous
interpretation since the resistance to substitution and risk aversion move together.
We will examine the effect of risk aversion on optimal climate policy and the effect
of resistance to substitution on sustainability.
Section two presents an ultra-long period model named ULTRAL. Section three
presents the calibration of the model, where we discuss numeric values for - and

. Section four presents the results, where we study the sensitivity of optimal
control strategies to specifications of the utility function, to uncertainty, and to a
sustainability constraint. Section five concludes.
6 HA DUONG AND TREICH
2. MODEL
The ULTRAL model is a stylized ultra-long period classical macroeconomic
model, stochastic with a recursive utility function, where climate change due to
021
 accumulation affects productivity and the efficiency of investment. The time
step is 30 years. There are four dates 3 starting from 1990, therefore three periods
representing current, next and future generations. There are two states of the world,
4
and 5 , referred to by the index 6 .
The model is coded in GAMS and solved using nonlinear optimization with
MINOS or CONOPT. In this section, we will discuss the equations of ULTRAL.
For convenience, they are presented all together in the annex. Equations can be
divided into three blocks. The first block A.1–A.5 describes classical economic
growth with a natural resource [33]. The second block A.6–A.9 computes 021 
accumulation, concentration, temperature increase and climatic damages. The
third block A.10–A.11 describes preferences.
2.1. Climate-economy
The macroeconomic block is built around a capital-labor-energy production
function. Population ﬃ87 is exogenous. All variables such as capital 9;:< 7 , energy
input =>:< 7 and production ?:< 7 are per-capita. Technical progress @ 7 is exogenous.
Productivity decreases with global warming through a multiplier AB:< 7 . Capital
depreciates and is renewed according to a fixed saving rate C 7 as described in
equation A.4.
The control variable DE:< 7 is a multiplier to the cost of the energy input. Ex-
ante, the reference cost of energy is F 7 . The amount of energy input =>:G< 7 entering
the production function depends upon F 7 DE:< 7 its ex-post cost. Broadly speaking,
DE:G<
7
H is the percentage of energy tax over the reference price. It is constrained
to be positive.
The model runs a cost-benefit analysis. The cost of control is computed as
follows. At period 3 , capital 9 :G< 7 is fixed from the previous period’s investment.
Productivity @ 7 and population ﬃ 7 are exogenous. Equations A.3 (discussed below)
and A.1 together determine production ? :< 7 and energy = :G< 7 . Consumption
0
:<
7
and investment follow since the saving rate is fixed. Economic activity decreases
with DI:< 7 .
Solving ?:< 7 and =>:< 7 equations yields:
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where superscripted parameters ?  and =  denote ex-ante first period values, and
where 9

is fixed. Note that for values of T much smaller than unity, production
?U:<
7 is much less elastic than energy =V:G< 7 to changes in energy cost DE:< 7 . Assuming
for example 3 
  , A

< :



and V TXW  in the above equations, then energy
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TABLE 1.
Reduction cost curve in first period.
YVZ+[ \^]E_ 0 10% 50% 100% 200%
`ba
Z+[ \ 0 -9% -24% -51% -68%
`bc
Z+[ \ 0 -0.4% -1.7% -2.8% -4.5%
consumption =

< : is inversely proportional to the tax D

< : , while output ?

< : only
decreases as D 'L

< :
. The corresponding reduction cost curve is numerically shown
in Table 1.
Equation A.3 stems implicitly from a behavioral assumption: the energy sector
maximizes its profit blindly, in a sequence of static equilibria. Due to this as-
sumption, the model can be seen as a two-stage optimization structure: economic
agents optimize within a 30-years horizon, and only the central planner has an
intergenerational point of view. Given that the price of output is 1 and the price of
energy is F 7 D :G< 7 , this assumption of intragenerational agent optimization implies
a well-known Cobb-Douglas function property, that:
?U:<
7
F
7
D
:<
7
=
:<
7


T
This corresponds to equation A.3. The share of energy T disappear because the
equation at date 3 is scaled with the equation at date 1. Note that equation A.1 is
also scaled this way. Adjustment costs kick-in to decrease consumption when D :< 7
increases faster than 2% per year, that is 1.81 per period. This is equation A.5.
Finally, the model represents the sequentiality of the decision making process
for climate policies. It is known from the start that the policy computed initially
will be revised at date 3 
edgf . This is why all variables are indexed by the state of
the world 6 and there is a constraint DEhi< 7
 DEj'< 7 for 3lk d f . This is a stochastic
dynamic programming technique which would not be needed if the concept of
“time unfolding on a stochastic tree” was built in the modeling languages. This
sophistication will only be important when we analyze uncertainty in the last
subsection 4.3, since before we will assume d f 
nm .
The benefits of reducing emissions are computed as follows. The carbon cycle
central variable is a simple non-controversial index used by scientists and policy-
makers: global cumulative fossil and industrial carbon emissions since 1990. Let
o
:<
7 be this index computed by equation A.6 in GtC.
ULTRAL uses a black-box linear representation based upon seven major models
described in [8]. At each period, these models associate 021  concentration levels
p
:<
7 with
o
:G<
7
. A linear relationship was estimated using least-square interpolation
to determine qBr7 and q 7 in equation A.7. Equation A.6 computes o :< 7 from p :< 7
using these linear coefficients.
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Temperature increase sI:G< 7 is estimated in equation A.8 using a 2.5-degrees
increase for a doubling of pre-industrial concentration. The 275 ppm number
represents pre-industrial levels of
021
 in the atmosphere.
Equation A.9 represents the economic effects of climate change At:G< 7 as an overall
mean-preserving productivity jump. It can be interpreted as an extreme irreversible
event, occurring at date dgu , which changes the global climatic conditions in such
a way that a major part of the capital and technological stock has to be replaced.
To account for the possibility of adaptation and published impact estimates [22],
the expected value of the productivity jump is zero: before d u , the model sets
A
7 


. At a given date d u , productivity drops permanently a lot with a small
probability v (state 4 ), or increases a little with a large probability w v (state
5 ). The magnitude of the fall depends quadratically upon temperature change.
2.2. Recursive utility
We now describe the representation of preferences with recursive utility. The
motivation is to separate attitude towards intertemporal substitution from attitude
towards risk.
Koopmans presented an early axiomatic deduction of recursive preferences [17].
He wrote x 7 


 7

x
7Gy

 and called

the aggregator function. Kreps and
Porteus [18] generalized this structure to stochastic models:
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where
{
7 is the certainty equivalent of future utility evaluated with information
available at date 3 . Let it be computed using } R~ , a von Neuman-Morgenstern
utility function:
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This class of preferences separates risk aversion — tied to the certainty equiva-
lence function
{
or } — from intertemporal substitution — tied to the aggregator
function

. Interestingly, they satisfy the properties of intertemporal consistency
and stationarity of preferences.
The specification of

and } is not unique. Define 
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 define the same preferences as
before.
Here we follow Epstein and Zin [10] and take  and
{
7 isoelastic:
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Three positive parameters

,

, and - characterize the preferences. The - in
the aggregator function is the constant resistance to intertemporal substitution.
The parameter  is the Arrow-Pratt constant relative risk aversion. The

is next
period’s felicity discount factor. Since it is known that isoelastic functions tend
continuously toward the logarithm when - or  tend towards unity, we will simply
ignore the cases - 
  or 
  .
It is possible to choose q according to the units of consumption and utility. In
one equation, the recursive preferences in the model are:
x
' 
7
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As usual in the literature, q is set to l

. In order to explain the assumptions
underlying this equality, let  be the expected growth of utility beyond the last
period, that is |xz 
. 
!


x . Then equation 7 is equivalent to:
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The equality q 
 2

arises from the two following conditions: x 
 
together with X
 . The first condition is numerically important. Our experience
shows that most other formulations for q lead to non-convergence when solving
for various

,
 and - . The second condition is a first approximation potentially
leading to mathematical problems with a zero utility discount rate,as



 implies
q


. Divergence under assumptions of zero growth and zero discounting is
normal since recursive preferences generalizes classical intertemporal utility. So,
the problem disappears if either some growth is assumed or,as here, utility discount
rate never goes to zero.
As shown equation A.10, the certainty equivalent of next generation utility
{
7	|
x
7Gy

 is explicitly represented by the state variable  7 defined by equation A.11.
In that equation, the 3 
m case is the final condition introduced above, where
consumption level   is not computed explicitly, but approximated by  Uﬁ

, where
9; is itself taken from equation A.4.
Finally, the guideline to introduce population ﬃ87 was to retrieve, in the special
case - 
/ , the standard intertemporal expected utility model:
ﬃ87
x
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3. CALIBRATION
3.1. Preferences
We now turn to the calibration of stochastic recursive utility functions. The
utility discount rate is set at 1% per year in the base case. Values 0, 0.5 and 2%
per year will also be discussed. This range of values is typical in the literature, see
for example Portney and Weyant [30].
The other two parameters - and  need more discussion.
First of all, the golden rule of optimal economic growth gives a theoretical way
for estimating - , given $ ,   ,  and real risk-free marginal productivity of capital
¡
. Let it be quickly reminded. Assuming in equation 2 that   
¢ 
!
&

and
ﬃ  
£

!
 
Rﬃ

, and that  ,   and $ are small, the marginal rate of substitution
between future and present consumption is:
¤P¥V¦
§




<


<

W

!
$X
 
!
-


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It follows from the first optimality condition 
!
¡2

¤¨¥V¦
©§

that ¡2
 $i  
!
-

.
Decreasing the annual utility discount rate $ can be compensated with a higher - .
With $ 
n , given  in the 1 to 2 percent per year range, annual global population
growth $ between 1 and 1.5, and ¡ in between 3 and 6 percent per year, this gives
- in the 2 to 7.5 range. But these calculations are subject to controversies. For
example, Cline [7] considers a wedge of market distortion reducing ¡ by 50%,
whereas Nordhaus [26] states that he does not see how anyone could convince
himself that ¡ is below 6%.
Following the seminal Kreps and Porteus’ paper [18], another interesting thought
experiment is to compare utility if  6  uncertainty is resolved at period 3 to utility
if  6ª6  uncertainty is resolved at period 2:

6
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It can be shown that early information  6Q6  is preferred if and only if )® - . In
this sense, assuming that society exhibit a taste for early information (or a distaste
for late information) would limit the range of plausible values for - and  . The
usual intertemporally additive expected utility model, corresponding to - 
e , is
equivalent to assuming indifference to the timing of uncertainty resolution.
Research on saving and portfolio behavior analysis derived empirical estimates
of  and - directly. In a seminal paper, Hall [14] estimated the response of saving
to the real interest rate, that is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (  J - ). All
estimates presented by Hall report small elasticity of substitution that may well
be zero. Ogaki and Reinhart [28] argued that Hall’s model was misspecified and
found estimates of resistance to substitution - that vary between 2.2 and 3.1.
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Another important issue with current - and  parametrisation is the equity
premium puzzle as exposed by Mehra and Prescott [21]. Mehra-Prescott and Hall
models have been criticized on the ground that they fail to separate resistance to
substitution from risk aversion. In doing so, Epstein and Zin [11] found estimates
for - that vary between 1.2 and 5 and estimates for  that vary between 0.8 and
1.3. Using a similar approach, Normandin and Saint-Amour [27] estimates for -
and  are in the range of 1.5. It is also noticeable that they accepted the hypothesis
-

n while Epstein-Zin rejected the expected utility model.
In an experimental framework, Barsky, Juster, Kimball and Shapiro [4] reported
estimates of each parameter based on individual responses to hypothetical situa-
tions. They found high heterogeneity among individuals. A striking results of
their study is that risk aversion and resistance to substitution are not correlated at
all across individuals.
We found no decisive empirical evidence either to reject or to accept intertem-
poral expected models ( - 
¯ ) nor to choose some specific values for - and  .
Arrow [1] reports that 1.5 is the currently available best-guess for both parameters.
ULTRAL uses values in the 0.6 to 4 interval, with emphasis upon 1.3 and 2.0.
3.2. Socio-economic scenarios
The socio-economic parameters are calibrated using preliminary Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change 1998 Scenarios, see the annex. There are four
scenarios A1, A2, B1 and B2. Each scenario proposes a particular future. It is
important to stress that these scenarios are non-mitigation scenarios with respect
to climate change.
According to the IPCC data distribution center,scenario A1 represents a world of
very rapid economic growth, low population growth and rapid introduction of new
and more efficient technology. In this world, people pursue personal wealth rather
than environmental quality. Scenario A2 describes a world with high population
growth with less concern for rapid economic development. Scenario B1 accounts
for dematerialization and for the introduction of clean technologies. Scenario B2
describes a world in which the emphasis is on local solutions to economic, social,
and environmental sustainability.
Parameters displayed in the annex correspond to the A1 scenario. Space con-
straints prevent us from reporting the four parameters set, but all numeric simula-
tions were conducted on all four scenarios. As can be seen on Figure 1 panel a,
future carbon emissions profiles span a large interval.
Population ﬃ87 and carbon content of energy ° 7 are drawn from IPCC scenarios.
Production and capital parameters are based upon order of magnitudes usually
accepted in theoretical and empirical literature. The saving ratio is C 7l
±²~³#´ for
all 3 . In the production function, the share of labor is ²~ µ , and the share of energy
is about ten times smaller than for capital, that is ¶ 
·^~ ¸Nµ and T 
·^~ #m . The
reduction cost curve in period 1 implicit to this is shown in Table 1.
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The ex-ante levels of production ?  and energy =  correspond to DE:G<




and are given parameters. The initial level of capital 9

is set at three times ?  .
Finally, capital depreciation factor ¹ and investment accumulation º are based
upon a 5% annual depreciation rate.
Calibration of @ 7 and F 7 was done as follows. Control DE:< 7 and damage AB:< 7 were
set to unity, i.e. ignored. This allowed to compute values for baseline energy costs
F
7 by using scenario values for ? :< 7 and = :G< 7 in equation A.3. Then coefficients for
technical progress @ 7 were computed by solving equations A.3 and A.1 recursively.
The effect of this calibration is that when there is no climate damage, growth tracks
the mark-up scenario from IPCC.
There is a 5% probability that one degree of warming causes a 10% drop in
productivity. That can be related to the EMF 14 uncertainty subgroup model com-
parison framed in [25]. That note suggested, with a 5% probability, to multiply the
damage function by 7.8. In this framework the 10% drop is equivalent to a 1.28%
unitary damage coefficient, which is in line with values used in the literature [5].
In the model, adding 3.5 degrees to the climate temperature sensitivity would have
the same effect as multiplying economic damage sensitivity by a factor of about
5.8.
3.3. Baseline optimal control
As a reference optimal control scenario, we consider the - 
  ~ ¸ , »
  ~ ¸
utility function. Policy revision and climate event occurs at the same period d f 

dgu
em
, for zero expected climate damage.
Panel b of Figure 1 displays the optimal
021
 emissions levels with ULTRAL
in each of the four IPCC markup scenarios. For each scenario, emissions rise
very slowly during first period, until 2020. Then the emissions of each scenario
strongly diverge. In scenario B1 for instance, there is a stabilization of emissions
around 8 GtC, while in scenario A2 emissions increase sharply from 5 GtC in 2020
to 16 GtC in 2050. These results bear no implications for the timing debate, given
the coarse 30-year time step.
The panel c of the same Figure 1 presents another view of the same results,where
the vertical axis shows optimal control level D :< 7 , i.e. the energy tax, instead of
carbon emissions. The horizontal time scale goes only to 2050, since D ﬀ< : equals
D
«
< : by assumption.
Both the carbon tax and the overall level of emissions are higher in scenario A2
than in any other scenarios in 1990 and 2020. Note however that this is no longer
true in 2050. There is higher control in 2050 for scenario A1 than for scenario
A2. This can be related to the growth effect: per capita production is very high
in scenario A1, the economy expands at an average rate of about three percent to
2080. As a consequence, investment in control will be relatively less costly in the
long run in scenario A1.
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FIG. 1. ULTRAL reference profiles. Panel a Baseline carbon emissions according to IPCC
preliminary 1998 scenarios. Panel b Optimal carbon emissions with ¼¾½ _¿ À and ÁÂ½ _¿ À utility
function. Panel c Corresponding optimal control Y2Ã\G[ Ä
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FIG. 2. Optimal control (energy cost multiplier Y ÃRÅ^ÆÄ ) for varying relative risk aversion Á , given
constant ¼i½
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4. RESULTS
4.1. Sensitivity to utility function coefficients
In this section, we examine the sensitivity of the optimal control profile to the
three parameters of the social planner’s preferences  , - and

.
What is the effect of risk aversion on the optimal climate policy? Some stud-
ies [6] found that risk aversion warrants aggressive abatement action while an-
other [24] did not find a large effect of risk aversion in his sensitivity analysis. A
problem is that these results are ambiguous since they are based upon a change
in the curvature of the utility function representing both resistance to substitution
and risk aversion.
The isolated effect of risk aversion was first investigated in the literature on sav-
ings under uncertainty. Selden [31] and Weil [34] used recursive preferences to
show that optimal precautionary savings tends to be determined solely by the elas-
ticity of intertemporal substitution and not by the risk aversion parameter. Similar
results were also found in the literature of dynamic resource management [15, 9].
Figure 2 displays the effect of relative risk aversion on the optimal climate policy
in scenario A2. We consider  varying from 0.5 to 4. Relative risk aversion leads
unambiguously to an increase in the carbon tax in order to face less risk in the
future. For example, increasing  from 1.3 to 2.6 leads to increase D 

from 1.29
to 1.65. Doubling risk-aversion does more than doubling the optimal energy tax
level.
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FIG. 3. Optimal control (energy cost multiplier Y Ã+Å^ÆÄ ) for varying resistance to intertemporal
substitution ¼ , given constant Áw½ _¿ À .
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With ULTRAL, the result that risk aversion increases optimal control is robust
with respect to the baseline scenario and the value of - .
Turning to the effect of resistance to intertemporal substitution,Figure 3 displays
the optimal carbon tax for different values of - . Numerical simulations show
that increasing resistance to substitution tends to rotate the optimal control path
counterclockwise, towards less control in the current period and more control
in the future periods. This goes in the direction of reducing the differences of
consumption levels between generations. The intuition explaining this results
is therefore that more emphasis on equity — larger - — imply higher current
emissions levels to smooth the differences with following, richer generations.
This is a discounting effect. Since control costs are borne in the short term and
benefits will be received in the long term, increasing - implies less control in the
current decade.
Indeed, as equation 9 shows, assuming a positive rate of growth, an increase in
- increases the cost discount rate. To some extend, $ and - have the same effect.
For example, for - 
¢e
³ and




, the optimal tax rate in first period is
15%. Model runs show that lowering the discount rate to 0.5 has basically the
same effect as lowering - from 2 to 1.3.
Sensitivity of results to joint variations in - ,  and

are reported in table 2
for the B2 scenario. Comparing the - 
¢±
  ~ ¸ cases with - 
¢±
³ , the
optimal tax level does not change much: from 15% to 17% in one case, from 77%
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TABLE 2.
Sensitivity of the optimal tax level at Ç^½È to the utility function parameters ¼ , Á and É .
Resistance to substitution ( ¼ ) 2 2 1.3 1.3 2 2 1.3 1.3
Aversion to risk ( Á ) 2 1.3 2 1.3 2 1.3 2 1.3
Annual discount rate (gives É ) 1% 1% 1% 1% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5%
Optimal tax level ( Y ÃRÊÆ
Æ
]E_ ) 15% 0% 72% 17% 77% 18% 83% 80%
to 80% in the other. This seemingly small sensitivity disappears when only - or
 change. This illustrates that parameters - and  tend to cancel out when they
move together.
In the light of previous results, the explanation is straightforward. Increasing
risk aversion leads to increase early control to prevent the climatic catastrophe.
But increasing resistance to substitution in the same time leads to decrease control
to favor the current generation which is the poorest in average. Thus the use
of intertemporally additive expected utility model ( - 
Ë ) underestimates the
sensitivity of the results since the two parameters move together and triggers these
two opposite effects.
Three main results emerged from this section. First, increasing risk aversion
 has a positive effect on the control rate. Second, increasing resistance to in-
tertemporal substitution - has the same effect as increasing the discount rate $ , it
decreases the initial level of control. Third and consequently, the classical expected
utility model induces a bias toward a more neutral climate policy.
4.2. Discounting and sustainability under uncertainty
If - and $ have the same effect, why use two parameters? The second result
above suggests that there is some redundancy in the parametrisation of recursive
utility function. One possibility is to eliminate time preference $ 
 and go for a
resistance to substitution higher than the usual - 
  log-of-consumption model,
for example - 
Ì³ . A more widespread attitude is to restrict utility functions to
the - 
Í subset and focus the discussion on $ .
In this section, we first explore with ULTRAL the difference between - and $
when it comes to the question of sustainability. The discussion of these results
will allow to show limitations of the attitude focusing only on the discount rate.
There are many definitions of sustainability. Amongst them, let us single out
Solow’s [32] formalization as non-decreasing utility through time. This interpre-
tation imposes a chain of obligation between each successive generation which can
very conveniently be represented with recursive utility. Sustainability under cer-
tainty is defined x 7 k±x 7Gy

, for all 3 . A natural generalization under uncertainty
discussed theoretically in [3] is:
x
7
k
{
7
|
x
7Gy

 (10)
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FIG. 4. Optimal control (energy cost multiplier Y ÃRÅ^ÆÄ ) with the sustainability constraint, for
¼l½
_¿ À
and Áw½ _¿ À .
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By using a certainty equivalent function
{
7
&~ 
, this definition allows welfare to
decrease if bad luck arises, but to an extent controlled by the risk aversion param-
eter. Pezzey [29] suggested to consider sustainability as a prior constraint on the
optimization program. It can also be used as a criteria to evaluate ex-post optimal
paths. We conducted both analysis.
We examined, for 76 model runs using varying parameters sets, which ones
were sustainable in the above sense. As could be expected, scenario A2 was the
least often sustainable, followed by B2, A1 and B1 in this order. This explains
why, when solving the model under the sustainability constraint 10, in the model
x
7
k»
7
, the effect is important only for A2 and B2 scenarios (compare figure 4
with the unconstrained optima figure 1 panel c).
Discounting felicity at a high rate, two or three percent per year, led to un-
sustainable pathways with two interesting exceptions. For A1 and $ 
Î³NÏ , a
risk aversion of n
³ restored sustainability where 
  ~ ¸ did not. For B1,
a resistance to substitution - 
¢³ led to sustainable optima. The latter result is
interesting since - 
  ~ ¸ did not lead to sustainability. Here $ and - have opposite
consequences on the optimal path.
Our explanation is that substitution effects depend upon the absolute level of
welfare, whereas discounting depends upon time. As long as there is a monotonous
relationship between time and wealth, i.e. growth, substitution and discounting are
broadly equivalent. But the stochastic model used here breaks this relationship for
some states of the world. This is why $ and - have opposite effects.
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This result illustrates that, from the sustainability point of view, there is more in
resistance to substitution than simply in discounting. Consequently, focusing the
debate on intergenerational equity only on $ is problematic.
This adds to other problems with the discounting approach when analyzing very
large scale and long term projects. There is an endogeneity question since large
scale projects affect the growth path of the economy. This path should not be
considered as exogeneous.
There is also the need to introduce risk when considering long-run projects. In
their recent path-breaking papers, Weitzman [35] and Gollier [12] examine directly
how macroeconomic uncertainty affects the choice of the discount rate. They prove
that it reduces significantly the discount rate for very long-term projects, maybe at
its lowest possible value. On the other hand, usual practice is to increase the dis-
count rate for risky project. For anthropic climate change, the correlation of risks
between emissions, economic activity and impacts therefore lead to ambiguity.
We do not see how analysis of sustainability could avoid to deal with non-
marginal differences in the welfare levels. More general models of intergenera-
tional utility, such as the stochastic recursive framework, seems to us more appro-
priate. It appears that increasing the discount rate is not the same as increasing the
resistance to intertemporal substitution.
4.3. Sensitivity to uncertainty
In this section we present the sensitivity of optimal control to uncertainty in
ULTRAL.
Results up to this point assumed d f 
/dgu)
em , in other words that bifurcations
occurs after 2050. We examine now how an earlier climatic event affects the
optimal control. Still assume d f 
±dgu , that policy is revised in the same period
as climate change happens. Figure 5 illustrates optimal strategies in a sequential
framework.
In a sequential framework, the central result is near-term policy: How does the
possibility of sooner climate event affect the optimal first-period control? Results
show that an later settlement of climate change uncertainties implies a higher
control in the short run. This result, which Ha-Duong, Grubb and Hourcade
already found in [23], calls some discussion.
At first, the potential for earlier climatic event implies larger total lifetime im-
pacts since they come sooner and thus last longer. This could lead to increase
control in the current period. But early damage also allows for a better adaptation
strategy since efforts may be developed sooner. There is thus also a substitution
effect between ex post and ex ante control. Figure 5 shows that the substitution
effect seems to dominate.
To confirm this hypothesis, we examined the difference between D 

sensitivity
to dgu and its sensitivity to d f . This needs some theoretical comments first.
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FIG. 5. Optimal control strategies Y Ã
Å^Æ
[ Ä for different period of uncertainty resolution, assuming
that policy revision and climatic event coincide, for ¼l½ _¿ À and Áw½ÐÈ .
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In many situations, assuming d u 
»d'f is realistic. In some financial markets
for example, the movements of exchange rates ( d'u ) are observed in real time by
operators which adjust their portfolio within minutes ( d f ). For climate change,
this is different.
There is ongoing climatic research and it is hopeful that scientists and policy-
makers will know well in advance the severity of climate change. This suggests
that precautionary action is possible, and gives background to the assumption
d
f
k
dgu of early perfect foresight. On the other hand, ULTRAL does not ex-
clude either the opposite situation d f ®ﬂdgu . This is a way to introduce inertia
into the model. International decision procedures usually involves a large time lag.
Another source of time lag is the natural variability of climate which complicate
detection and attribution of anthropic climate change. This is why in ULTRAL
there is no a priori relation between d u , the date of climatic event, and dgf , the
date of policy revision.
Table 3 summarizes sensitivity of first-period optimal control D
Ñ


to the un-
certainty parameters dgu , d f and risk aversion  , with - 
  ~ ¸ in the A2 scenario.
Results are very sensitive to d f indeed. Compare the line d f 
nm with d f 
e¸ .
There is much lower initial control with earlier policy revision. For the lower
values of risk aversion  k ³ , earlier learning may even lead to no effort at all.
This remains when comparing d f 
/m with d f 
³ . This a standard wait and see
effect which can be linked to the theory of irreversibility. The prospect to be able
to adapt policies sooner gives an incentive to differ control.
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TABLE 3.
Sensitivity of optimal initial tax ( YÒÃ+Å^ÆZ ];_ ) to uncertainty parameters ÓÔ , ÓÕ and Á .
ÁV½
À¿ Ö
ÓSÕÂ½Â×
ÓÕÂ½ÐÈ ÓSÕÂ½
À
ÓSÕ;½Ð× Áw½
_¿ À
Áw½
À¿ Ö
Áw½ÐØ
¿ Ù
Ó Ô ½È 24% 27% 28% 0 28% 48%
ÓSÔE½
À 01% 11% 10% 0 10% 65%
ÓSÔE½Ð× 55% 74% 81% 29% 81% 81%
Results confirm the hypothesis that the substitution effect dominates the damage
effect. Table 3 shows that optimal control is much less sensitive to d u than to
dgf
. Chancey Starr has a saying he calls the Noah principle of decision under
uncertainty: “Predicting rains does not count, building ark does”.
Studying the sensitivity of results to uncertainty parameters with recursive utility
is all the more interesting that it most published work to date has been led with
a logarithmic intertemporal expected utility function [20, 24, 16]. Yet Gollier,
Julien and Treich [13] have shown that the logarithmic case is precisely the limit
case where better information has no effect on the level of current consumption in
a stock pollutant model (take Ú
  in their proposition 1). With respect to this
initial motivation of our work, numerical simulations led with parameters close to
1 were non conclusive.
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5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered the generalized Kreps-Porteus stochastic recursive
preferences that permit to cut the link between risk aversion  and resistance to
intertemporal substitution - . They were used to build a stylized intergenerational
integrated assessment model, ULTRAL.
The model has zero climate damages on average. This highlight a simple insight:
the assumption of a positive expected climate damage is absolutely not needed to
induce some precautionary abatement in the optimal path.
Another characteristic of the model is the distinction between the date of policy
revision d f and the date of effective climate change dgu . It was found that the
initial level of abatement is much more sensitive to the former than to the latter:
The earlier is policy revision scheduled, the lower is initial carbon tax level.
On the theoretical side, stochastic recursive utility contributes directly to the
discussion on discounting in cost-benefit analysis [2, 19, 30] by providing an
unifying framework for the main different points of view. For example, many
climate change models use the discounted sum of logarithmic expected utility,
corresponding to the - 
Í
  case. In this paper, we analyzed the sensitivity of
the optimal energy consumption path to the specifications of the utility function.
The first result is that larger risk aversion strengthens optimal pollution control.
Second, larger resistance to substitution — more emphasis on intergenerational
equity — rotates the optimal control path toward less control in the current decade
and more control in the future. This compares with an increase in the utility
discount rate, but the effects differ from a sustainability point of view. Third and
finally, low resistance to substitution - with high risk aversion  leads to the largest
carbon tax levels. Constraining - 
Û leads to underestimating the sensitivity of
results to the shape of the utility function.
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APPENDIX: THE ULTRAL MODEL
Variables
DE:G<
7 Energy cost multiplier (Control variable)
?U:<
7 Production (PIB per capita per year in kUS$ 90)
9;:<
7 Capital stock (kUS$ 90 per capita)
= :<
7 Energy input (toe per capita per year)
0
:G<
7 Consumption (kUS$ 90 per capita per year)
Ü
:<
7 Adjustment costs factor (% of investment)
o
:<
7 Begin-of-period cuMulative global emissions (GtC)
p
:<
7 Begin-of-period
021
 mixing ratio (ppmv)
sI:G<
7 Equilibrium temperature increase ( Ý C)
AB:<
7 Climate damage (fraction of ?:G< 7 )
xz:<
7 Utility (k dol. 90 per capita)
^:<
7 Certainty equiValent of next generation’s utility (kUS$ 90 p.c.)
Equations
ULTRAL maximizes x hi<

under constraints A.1-A.11, the stochastic dynamic
programming constraint D j'< 7 
 D hi< 7 for all 3Ek d'f and the final stationarity
condition D :G<  
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Parameters (A1 scenario)
¶ Elasticity of capital 0.36
T Elasticity of energy 0.04
ﬃ87 World population 5.26, 7.49, 8.70, 7.72 Giga
@
7 Technical progress coefficient 1.00, 1.81, 3.69, 5.52
C
7 Saving ratio 0.25
F
7 Baseline increase in the energy input cost 1.00, 1.28, 2.05, 2.70
?
 Production per capita in 1990 without damages 3.97 k$90
=
 Energy per capita in 1990 without reduction 1.07 toe
9

Initial capital 11.92 k$90
¹ Inter-period depreciation of capital 0.215
º Inter-period accumulation of investment 16.14
æ Maximum X annual variation without adj. costs 0.02

Inter-period utility discount factor 0.74
- Resistance to intertemporal substitution 1.3
 Relative risk aversion 2.0
ç
Duration of a period 30 years
°
7 Carbon content of energy 1.10, 1.03, 0.68, 0.39 tC/toe
qòr
7 Intercept of the carbon-cycle relation 354, 371, 390, 297 ppmv
q

7 Slope of the carbon-cycle relation 0, 0.154, 0.129, 0.278 ppmv/toe
d
u Date of impact: productivity jump Event 4
dgf Date of policy Revision 4
v Probability for a negative impact 0.05
í
Magnitude of damage for 1 Ý C warming 0.1
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Scenarios
Data from IPCC preliminary 1998 scenarios used for calibration. Year 2080
values are linearly interpolated except for emissions. Energy Intensity in B1 taken
from A1.
1990 2020 2050 2080 2100
Population _&Ùó 5.3 7.5 8.7 7.7 7.1
A1 GNP per capita 1990k$ 4.0 7.5 20.8 50.5 74.9
Energy Intensity MJ/$ 11.3 8.8 5.5 4.2 3.3
Population _&Ù
ó 5.3 8.2 11.3 12.4 13.1
A2 GNP per capita 1990k$ 4.0 5.0 7.3 8.9 9.9
Energy Intensity MJ/$ 12.8 12.4 10.0 7.4 5.7
Population _&Ù
ó 5.3 7.8 8.9 7.9 7.2
B1 GNP per capita 1990k$ 4.0 6.2 12.8 31.4 46.7
Energy Intensity MJ/$ 11.3 8.8 5.5 4.2 3.3
Population _&Ù
ó 5.3 7.7 9.4 10.0 10.4
B2 GNP per capita 1990k$ 4.0 6.6 11.7 18.5 22.6
Energy Intensity MJ/$ 12.9 8.5 6.0 4.8 4.0
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